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Introduction 
The Rada and EU integration? 
 
At first glance, parliaments are not a ‘central site’ for European integration in current, 
candidate or aspiring members. Indeed, policy making is a realm that regardless of 
specific constitutional arrangements has increasingly become the preserve of the 
executive due to the growing complexity of government, the concomitant growth of 
the bureaucracy and globalisation (Norton 1990). European integration has been seen 
as contributing to this process due to the delegation of substantial legislative functions 
‘upwards’ to the EU and the limited capacities of national parliaments to hold 
executives to account over their role in EU policy formation (Judge 1995). 
Furthermore, given that much of the literature of post-Soviet politics has pointed to 
the dominance of presidential executives over weakly institutionalised parliaments 
(e.g. Ishiyama and Kennedy 2001), it would be expected that in these ‘neighbouring’ 
states the legislature would have an even more marginal role to play in shaping the 
pattern and pace of integration with European (and other international) structures. As 
Protsyk (2003: 437-9) argues, this was the case in Ukraine under President Kuchma, 
where the parliament (Verkhovna Rada) was willing to accept presidential leadership 
in European matters. 
 
But I argue that parliament does and will have if not a central then an important role 
in shaping the pace and nature of EU integration in Ukraine for three reasons: 
• The implementation of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan (signed on 21 February 2005) 
requires the adoption of a large raft of legislation by the Rada in conjunction with 
the government. Therefore, the Rada’s legislative capacity is likely to impact on 
this process (the shenanigans over the WTO legislation discussed below offer 
strong evidence of this). 
•  After the constitutional reforms adopted on December 8 2004 came into force at 
the beginning of 2006 the Rada’s formal policy influence increased, including on 
European issues. 
• A parliament able to perform its constitutionally-designated functions is necessary 
for Ukraine to meet the political aspects of the Copenhagen criteria: ‘stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for 
and protection of minorities’ (Sweeney, 2005). This is not only because the Rada 
adopts the necessary legislation to support these political criteria, but also by being 
a stable democratic institution itself.  
So, I am arguing that the Rada matters to Ukraine’s democratic and European 
development in both the narrow and broad senses.  
 
If we accept this premise, then understanding the Rada’s institutional capacity and 
legislative process will provide insights into the some of the domestic factors 
affecting Ukraine’s prospects for European integration. Therefore, this paper will 
examine the Rada’s legislative capacity by first looking at internal institutions and 
structure and then its interactions with the government of Yulia Tymoshenko 
(February-September 2005). Although progress in institutionalising the legislative 
process was made, the main obstacles to constructive interaction between the 
branches remained rooted in the weakness of the party system in the context of a 
semi-presidential system that did not create clear lines of accountability. How far the 
constitutional reforms that came into force in 2006 are showing signs of ameliorating 
these problems will be considered in conclusion.  
 
Legislative Capacity in Ukraine 
 
Ukraine’s further European integration depends to  certain extent on the adoption of 
legislation necessary for the implementation of the Action Plan and a continuation 
(acceleration) of the process of harmonising Ukraine’s legislation with that of the 
EU’s. Clearly, Ukraine’s ability to do this is intimately connected to the Rada’s 
legislative capacity. Initially, we can note the growing legislative capacity of the Rada 
as with each convocation the Rada adopted more laws: for 1994-8 there were 752 
laws passed (compared to 471 1990-4); for 1998-2002 the figure was 1131, and for 
the 2002-6 convocation 1250 (Apparat of the Verkhovna Rada, 2006: 96). Although 
this broadly suggests an increasing capacity to draft, scrutinize and adopt legislation, 
this is rather a crude measure that does not indicate the importance or quality of 
legislation. Indeed there were serious concerns about the quality of legislation 
adopted in terms of its internal consistency and its compatibility with existing 
legislation (Lytvyn 2003).1 Contradictory legislation was a symptom of broader 
problems in the Rada: a lack of institutionalisation of norms and procedures in this 
relatively new institution;2 the fragmented, relatively unstructured and clientelistic 
composition of the deputy corpus; and a constitutional arrangement that provided 
relatively few incentives for cooperation between the executive and legislative 
branches. These factors were not significantly altered by the ‘orange revolution’ and 
the advent of President Yushchenko’s administration and will be examined below. 
 
Inside the Verkhovna Rada 
Although internally the Rada did make significant progress in institutionalising norms 
and procedures concomitant with a modern democratic parliament, adopting for 
example standing orders (1994) and the law ‘on standing committees’ (1995), internal 
divisions prevented these from being brought into line with the subsequent 
constitution (1996) and their implementation remained patchy.3 This meant that more 
controversial legislation tended to be examined and adopted by ad hoc procedures 
which regularly sidestepped the formal rules.4 At the same time, the Rada built a 
committee system which formally resembled its western counterparts – permanent, 
paralleling government, comparatively well-resourced and (loosely) representative of 
the parent chamber, which enabled committees to process and scrutinize a growing 
volume of legislation. Although this did lead to a shift away from examining 
legislation on the floor of parliament, thus enhancing the parliament’s legislative 
                                                
1 The case of tax legislation was notorious. For example, the State Tax Administration Order on VAT 
refunds contradicted the law on VAT, giving the tax administration the scope to choose which to 
adhere to. See Bidai, Frensch and Leschenko (2004, p.7, footnote 26). 
2 Although the Verkhovna Rada was in fact created in 1937, it was not until 1990 that 
it began to assume genuine law-making and representative functions.  
3 To bring parliamentary procedures into line with the constitutional changes that 
came into force in January 2006, new standing orders were adopted in March 2006.  
4 For example, the first reading of the bill to amend the constitution on December 24 
2003 was passed using a highly irregular voting procedure by a show of hands. Also 
see Whitmore (2004: 86-90, 145).   
capacity, the structure of committees remained sub-optimal, with significant workload 
variations because all attempts at reform were blocked by the cross-cutting interests 
of parliamentary factions (party and non-party based caucuses) seeking resources and 
influence in specific policy areas (Whitmore 2006).  
 
Moreover, the orange revolution and creation of a new administration proved 
disruptive to committees’ operations as eight committee chairs were appointed to the 
government and these positions were left vacant. Although this indicated that the 
Rada had become a genuine pool for elite socialisation and recruitment, it also meant 
the Rada was deprived of some of its most experienced deputies. The failure to make 
new appointments was largely due to the fragmented distribution of political forces in 
the Rada, who each sought to control these valuable positions.  
 
The elusive parliamentary majority 
A multi-party system emerged relatively late in Ukraine, after the semi-free elections 
of 1990 and the system of political caucuses5 (party-based factions and non-party 
deputy groups) did not become formally institutionalised until after the 1994 elections 
(Verkhovna Rada, 1994). Until the 2006 elections, the Verkhovna Rada was 
characterised by a large and fluctuating number (usually 12-15) factions and deputy 
groups with a rapid turnover of membership. For example, during June 2005 there 
were 12 factions in the Rada, although in the aftermath of the presidential elections, 
the frequency of members switching factions was high (around 2 per week in May-
July 2005). Figure 1 shows the composition of the Rada on 24 June 2005.  
 
                                                
5 I have used the term ‘political caucuses’ instead of the more usual ‘party caucuses’ 
to denote the non-party basis of many of these bodies. As well as deputy groups, 
which could be formed by any 14 deputies, factions that were based on political 
parties often included a considerable (and fluid) number of non-party members, while 
party members sometimes chose to join factions or groups outside of their party 
affiliation.  
Figure 1: Composition of the Verkhovna Rada, 24 June 2005 
Faction/Deputy Group Number of members 
Pro-Yushchenko/government 194 
Our Ukraine 88 
Ukrainian People’s Party (Kostenko) 24 
Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko 40 
Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs 15 
Socialist Party of Ukraine 27 
  
‘Centrists’ 89 
People’s Party (Lytvyn) 40 
Democratic Ukraine (Sharov, Pinchuk) 20 
United Ukraine (Hubs’kyi) 21 
Democratic Initiatives (Havrysh) 10 
  
Opposition 126 
Regions of Ukraine 50 
SDPU(o) 20 
Communist Party of Ukraine 56 
  
Non-affiliated 40 
Source: www.rada.gov.ua  
 
Although the factions of Tymoshenko, the Socialists and Volodymyr Lytvyn’s 
People’s Party were initially able to swell their ranks as deputies deserted the former 
pro-Yanukovych factions and sought to realign themselves with the new 
administration, and the opposition factions were disorientated by their new status and 
rarely able to coordinate their actions,6 a parliamentary majority to support the 
government did not emerge. Even ostensibly ‘pro-administration’ factions were less 
than whole-hearted in their commitment to support the government. Deputy Prime 
Minister Anatoliy Kinakh’s Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs did not vote in 
support of the government’s budget, while the Socialists and Yuriy Kostenko’s 
People’s Party announced their unwillingness to support government bills where they 
did not coincide with their principles (Lymar’ 2005 and Action Ukraine Report, no. 
507, 22 June 2005). Thus, bills were passed by situational majorities formed around 
each piece of legislation, some of which gained in excess of 300 votes as the pro-
government and centrists plus part of the so-called opposition voted in favour. At the 
same time however, the process was rendered unpredictable and the government 
could not always rely on a majority to enact key legislation. This was clearly 
illustrated by the failure to adopt key amendments to the law on intellectual property 
(i.e. concerning laser disc piracy) on May 31, which was required for Ukraine’s entry 
to the WTO and for the lifting of US sanctions. The bill failed by just 17 votes as the 
government did not get the full support of deputies from ‘its’ factions – Our Ukraine 
and the Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (Kuzio 2005).  
 
This situation was not unusual for the Rada. The lack of a parliamentary majority 
characterised most of the post-Soviet period. Twice, from January 2000 until January 
                                                
6 For example, the voting on the budget on 25 March demonstrated this, as Regions of 
Ukraine refused to participate, while SDPU(o) and the Communists voted in favour.  
2001 and from November 2002 until September 2004, President Kuchma was able to 
generate pro-presidential majorities with the help of loyal deputy-oligarchs by a 
combination of blackmail (using kompromat from Ukraine’s extensive surveillance 
system inherited from the Soviet period, or various inspections of deputies’ 
businesses) and bribery. For limited periods, Kuchma’s ‘blackmail state’ was efficient 
at producing a relatively compliant parliament to enact legislation,7 although because 
of the artificial nature of such majorities, their cohesion and life-span was limited. 
The creation of artificial majorities was facilitated by the large number of deputy-
entrepreneurs8 who had business interests to protect (and advance) and were also 
potential clients for executive patronage (Protsyk and Wilson 2003). At the same time 
though, this engendered a proliferation of attempts to pass ‘lobbyist laws’, particularly 
in the sphere of tax legislation.9 Initially under Yushchenko, the bribery and 
blackmail tactics to put together a majority were not in evidence (Syrotiuk 2005, 
Riabchenko 2005, Ter’okhin 2006), but unfortunately this meant that insufficient 
incentives existed for a majority to form, an issue that haunted the administration until 
the parliamentary elections were held in March 2006. 
 
Semi-presidentialism in Ukraine: Explaining inter-branch conflict and the absence of 
a majority 
Ukraine’s semi-presidential system did not create incentives for a parliamentary 
majority. The 1996 Constitution created a president-parliamentary system 
where the president and parliament had ‘competing political legitimacies, rigid 
terms of office and differing electoral bases’(Protsyk 2003a: 1078) while the 
powers of parliament and president overlapped in terms of oversight and 
dismissal of the government, the organisation of other executive bodies and law-
making. This design created the potential for inter-branch conflict or deadlock 
also seen in presidential systems as well as a few incentives for the formation of a 
parliamentary majority (Mainwaring 1992, Linz 1990). In many ways the 
president had precedence over parliament regarding the formation, control and 
dismissal of the government and the Rada had limited opportunities for 
influencing the government. There were no provisions for the Verkhovna Rada 
to play a role in appointing the government or in taking responsibility for its 
actions. Parliament was simply required to confirm the president's nomination 
for Prime Minister (art.85.12) and the government's annual programme 
(art.85.6). This formally implied that there was no role in the constitution for a 
                                                
7 Such ‘efficiency’ was however at best partial as since the mid-1990s the proportion 
of government legislation enacted has tended to decline, contrary to trends in Western 
democracies where the ‘90% rule’ (90% of legislation is initiated by the government 
and 90% of it is passed) operates. See Whitmore (2004:151-2), Pavlenko (2002) and 
Protsyk (2003a: 1083). Nevertheless, during 1998-2002, factions which belonged to 
the 2000-1 majority voted along with executive initiatives 83% of the time (Protsyk 
and Wilson, p.715).  For more on the mechanisms of a ‘blackmail state’, see Darden 
(2001). 
8 364 (of 450) in 2000 according to Mykola Azarov, then head of the State Tax 
Administration (Holos Ukrainy, 25 April 2000, p.2). However, this figure increased 
after the 2002 elections.   
9 Evidence for this was provided in accounts by parliamentary deputies and staff in 
interviews with the author, March 2003. Also see Hellman, Jones and Kaufman 
(2000:10).  
parliamentary majority and thus, no incentives for factions to form and 
maintain a coalition that would enact the government programme and take 
responsibility for its actions (see Protsyk 2003a). Yushchenko’s decision to form 
a coalition government allocating proportions of posts to the parties in the ‘Force 
of the People’ coalition and those that backed him in the second round of the 
presidential election (i.e. the Socialists and Party of Industrialists and 
Entrepreneurs) broke with the tradition of appointing non-partisan 
‘technocratic’ governments and clearly attempted to give various parliamentary 
factions a stake in the government in the hope that this would lead to the 
emergence of a majority, but this was not a sufficient ‘carrot’ to overcome 
disparate interests and squabbling. Therefore, when Tymoshenko’s government 
was dismissed by President Yushchenko in September 2005, it was replaced by a 
more ‘traditional’ technocratic government led by Yuriy Yekhanurov.  
 
In the context of a weak party system, semi-presidentialism in Ukraine produced 
cabinets more closely reflecting presidential preferences, unable to rely on a 
parliamentary majority to enact their legislative programme. Indeed, 1994-2006 
figures indicate a declining capacity of governments to get their legislation passed 
(Protsyk 2003a: 1079 and author’s calculations from Apparat of the Verkhovna Rada, 
2006: 100). The absence of institutional mechanisms to resolve disputes over policy 
between parliament and the executive (i.e. the president and/or the government) 
means that inter-branch conflict was built into Ukraine’s political system and became 
one of its defining features, along with an ongoing debate about constitutional 
reform.10 
 
Inter-branch relations in the new administration 
Initially after Yushchenko became president, relations between the president and 
Rada became less confrontational than under Kuchma, largely as a product of a 
management style different from his predecessor and based on the desire to maintain 
good relations with speaker Lytvyn and other allies in the Rada in the run up to the 
March 2006 parliamentary elections. During 2005, Yushchenko refrained from 
making the kind of trenchant criticism of the Rada’s operation that Kuchma 
frequently made and from utilising Kuchma’s ‘divide and rule’ tactics, but at the same 
time he did by-pass the Rada on several occasions, using presidential decrees to 
regulate areas properly in the jurisdiction of the Rada (Rakhmanin 2005) and rarely 
using his right of legislative initiative. In sum, Yushchenko stood aloof from the 
legislative process. 
 
Turning to the government, under Kuchma in general legislative-executive relations 
were persistently confrontational – as indicated by the prolonged battle by the 
president to increase his competences vis-à-vis the Rada, firstly via the constitutional 
process and subsequent enabling legislation, then via various attempts to amend the 
constitution (Whitmore 2004). At a more micro-level, relations with the Rada’s 
committees were characterised by frequent contacts and generally seen by deputies as 
constructive. However, successive governments (including Yushchenko’s (2000-
                                                
10 On the constitutional debate see Christensen, Rakhimkulov and Wise (2005), 
pp.207-230. For elaboration on the incentive structures and interactions between the 
three actors: president, parliament and government, see Protsyk (2003) and Pavlenko 
(2002).   
2001)) tended to consult factions and committees only on an ad hoc rather than 
routine basis (Pavlenko 2002: 152). Effective cooperation over legislation was also 
impeded by the high turnover of ministers and the dependence on personal relations 
due to the lack of a regulatory framework (a consequence of the failure to adopt the 
law ‘on the Cabinet of Ministers’).11 There was also a tendency for ministries to send 
low ranking officials to committee meetings, which did not inspire deputies’ 
confidence. Deputies also consistently complained about the quality of bills 
emanating from the Cabinet of Ministers and it remained common for the Rada to 
pass the committee’s ‘alternative’ bill rather than the government’s draft (Whitmore 
2004: 173-4). 
 
Interactions between the coalition government under Tymoshenko and the Rada 
initially looked promising. The government was confirmed by a record number of 
votes as was the government’s budget in March 2005. However, the institutional 
context had not altered, so ministers - seeing the Rada as largely unable to sanction 
them - lacked incentives to routinely engage with parliament during the legislative 
process. Therefore, like its predecessor, the Tymoshenko government struggled to get 
its legislation through the Rada. During the 7th session (Feb-Jul 2005), only 31% of 
bills initiated by the government were enacted.12 Familiar frustrations were vented by 
speaker Lytvyn about flawed and rushed government bills sent to the Rada at the last 
minute and ministers not coming to the Rada themselves, but sending ‘their ten 
deputies’ (Riabchenko 2005). That contacts between the government and 
parliamentary committees remained ad hoc according to the needs of the government 
was illustrated by the emergency situations minister failing to meet with members of 
the relevant committee to discuss planned reforms to the Chornobyl policy, so that the 
chair complained that the committee found out about this via the media (Holos 
Ukrainy, 13 April 2005: 2). Dissatisfaction was also expressed on the government 
side, with a sharply worded article in Ukrains’ka Pravda by Deputy Prime Minister 
Mykola Tomenko (2005) in which he lambasted the Rada for excessive lobbyism on 
behalf of their business interests, adopting unrealistic, unworkable laws and the 
leadership of the Rada for violating the standing orders to further their personal 
interests. By the end of summer 2005, an exchange of increasingly sharply-worded 
statements between the government and the Rada indicated that patterns of inter-
branch relations had reverted to type (e.g. Holos Ukrainy, 14, 15 July 2005 and 
Syrotiuk 2005a).    
 
                                                
11 This meant that the activity of the Cabinet of Ministers and the authority of the 
Prime Minister were regulated by a large number of laws. In 1997, 440 laws formed 
the legal framework for the operation of the Cabinet, while 250 laws framed the 
Prime Minister’s activities (Holos Ukrainy, 9 April 2005, pp.8-9). Although these 
figures may have changed somewhat, the overall situation has not, though in autumn 
2006 both president and the government of Viktor Yanukovych each renewed 
initiatives to adopt the law on the Cabinet of Ministers, and the Rada adopted the 
government’s bill in first reading on 16 November 2006. 
12 For comparison, on average during 2002-5, 39% of government legislation was 
enacted. Calculations by independent NGO Laboratory F-4 on the basis of official 
figures made available on the Rada website (www.rada.gov.ua), supplied to the author 
by Edward Rakhimkulov.  
To bring into sharp relief how difficult inter-branch relations and Ukraine’s 
fragmented political caucuses can impact on Ukraine’s implementation of the Action 
Plan and broader integration into European structures, the process of adopting the 
legislation required for WTO entry provides an appropriate illustration. WTO entry 
(along with gaining market economy status) was considered a key precondition for 
Ukraine’s further European integration and Yushchenko made entry in autumn 2005 a 
clear priority (Action Ukraine Report no.505, 20 June 2005). However, this 
necessitated the adoption of 21 priority laws by the end of July 2005, yet the 
government allowed insufficient time for these to pass through the usual legislative 
process. By June 20, less than a month before the end of the session, only 16 of these 
bills had been passed to the Rada for examination (although the president promised 
the other 5 would follow within a week). The Rada leadership expressed serious 
doubts about parliament’s ability to adopt these bills in such a short period 
(Riabchenko 2005 and 2005a). Prime Minister Tymoshenko’s response was to ask the 
faction leaders to adopt 14 economic bills in a single package, by-passing the normal 
legislative process of committee scrutiny, first and second readings (Action Ukraine 
Report no.507, 22 June 2005). Yushchenko supported the Prime Minister’s move, 
stating: ‘There is little to discuss [in the draft laws], they should just be approved’ 
(Action Ukraine Report no.505, 20 June 2005). While the executive’s haste in order 
to facilitate joining the WTO as soon as possible was understandable, it also intimated 
a disregard by its two most senior politicians for due process.  
 
In the Rada, the situational position of factions with representatives in the government 
was highlighted as, perhaps unsurprisingly, faction leaders reacted badly to the 
request for ‘package voting’: the Socialists flatly refused while Kostenko’s People’s 
Party attempted to leverage some concessions for their various constituencies in 
exchange for compliance (Action Ukraine Report no.507, 22 June 2005) and the 
opposition of the Party of Regions and Communists successfully disrupted several 
plenary sessions by blocking the rostrum, brawling and refusing to vote on WTO 
legislation ostensibly in protest at around 30 members of the executive illegally 
retaining their deputy’s mandates. However, such procedural wrangles merely served 
to obscure elements of broader opposition to the WTO (in some cases in principle, in 
others to specific pieces of legislation linked to their business constituencies) that ran 
across institutions and threatened to split the government coalition. For example, the 
minister of agriculture, socialist Oleksandr Baranivskyi, publicly opposed the 
government’s WTO legislation relating to agriculture. Eventually 8 of the 14 
economic bills were passed by the summer recess, including the crucial intellectual 
property bill which enabled the lifting of US sanctions. This became possible after the 
president belatedly engaged in the process, met with faction leaders and demonstrably 
supported the government by attending key plenary sessions, but in the aftermath the 
Prime Minister and speaker engaged in bitter recriminations over who was to blame 
for the WTO debacle (Holos Ukrainy, 14, 15 July 2005 and Zerkalo Nedeli, 16 July 
2005).  Yushchenko vowed that the remaining WTO legislation would be passed in 
autumn 2005. However, the impending parliamentary election campaign made 
factions less likely to compromise on legislation that might affect their business and 
electoral constituencies, so this task was only returned to in autumn 2006 under the 
new government of Viktor Yanukovych, with the working deadline of WTO entry 
officially shifted to February 2007.13  
 
Ineffective cooperation between the Tymoshenko government and the Rada was 
compounded by the large number of executive structures responsible for Euro-
Atlantic integration and the unclear and contested division of competences between 
them. These included the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the newly upgraded National 
Security and Defence Council, the Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration 
and the Presidential Secretariat (Kuzio 2005). In the absence of a law ‘on the Cabinet 
of Ministers’, ‘on the president’ and on other executive organs, it remained uncertain 
which bodies or officials parliamentary committees and the Rada leadership should be 
coordinating their activities with over the issue of WTO legislation. If we recall the 
aforementioned internal problems that factions and committees within the Rada have 
in coordinating their activities, then the fate of much of the WTO legislation during 
2005 seemed overdetermined. 
 
Conclusion and Prospects  
 
Ukraine’s legislative process is an important domestic factor in the process of 
European integration both in terms of fulfilling the Action Plan and in the broader 
sense. Although the Rada made significant progress in institutionalising the 
procedural basis for a functioning democratic parliament and in raising its legislative 
capacity through greater structuring via parliamentary factions and committees, 
serious impediments to effective law-making remained, which contributed to 
Ukraine’s convoluted, patchy, occasionally contradictory and difficult-to-implement 
legal framework. The most fundamental problems were: 
• Weakness of the party system, leading to a fragmented and clientelistic deputy 
corpus where factions lacked cohesion and promoted individualistic agendas 
• The absence of a parliamentary majority, which rendered the legislative process 
unpredictable, leaving governments struggling to enact their policy programme 
even after its parliamentary approval. 
• Inter-branch cooperation was ad hoc and relations were often confrontational, 
tendencies that grew out of the incentive structure created by the semi-presidential 
system. 
 
On December 8 2004 parliament adopted changes to the constitution and a new fully 
proportional electoral law which together re-shaped the division of powers in Ukraine 
when they came into force in 2006. These changes ostensibly sought to address the 
problems listed above by creating incentives for the formation of a parliamentary 
coalition (the president is able to dissolve the Rada if it does not form one), which 
then appoints the government and can dismiss ministers unilaterally, so that ministers 
are more likely to respond to the Rada as their principal. Technically, these changes 
sought to replicate the incentive structures between the branches found in 
                                                
13 Movement was made on adopting this legislation during the autumn 2006 session due to a complete 
about-face of the Party of Regions, whose role in disrupting the attempts of summer 2005 had been 
prominent. However, despite the existence of a formal parliamentary coalition, legislation was adopted 
by ad hoc coalitions of the Party of Regions and Socialists together with Our Ukraine and the 
Tymoshenko bloc. 
parliamentary systems.14 Furthermore, the move to a 100% proportional 
representation electoral system on the basis of party lists aimed to strengthen the role 
of parties in the political system, which form the basis for the parliamentary coalition. 
In principle, more cohesive parliamentary caucuses were also encouraged by the 
inclusion of the so-called ‘imperative mandate’ into the constitution – deputies now 
lose their mandate if they leave the party faction on whose list they were elected.  
 
However, early indicators suggest that the constitutional and electoral law changes 
may not resolve fully the problems they were intended to address, and indeed have 
created new problems. This is predictable to a certain extent as formal institutional 
arrangements have typically told us little about the actual structure and operation of 
power in Ukraine as the ‘rules gap’ between legal norms and elite behaviour has been 
substantial, making the outcomes of reforms difficult to predict (Whitmore 2004). 
Furthermore, the constitutional amendment bill 4180 was vague in key areas 
(Koliushko and Tymoshyk 2004) and required further enabling legislation, including 
specification of the parliamentary coalition and the long-overdue law on the Cabinet 
of Ministers, on the president and on other executive bodies. Such bills in Ukraine 
have always been the object of a struggle over the division of powers and thus 
difficult to adopt (see below). This leaves considerable room for manoeuvre in terms 
of the operation of informal practices and will also potentially prolong institutional 
uncertainty in Ukraine, and thus to fulfilling the political aspects of the Copenhagen 
criteria. More generally, transferring powers to the Rada will not necessarily make the 
authorities in Ukraine more responsible or accountable because a key mechanism for 
popular accountability in consolidated democracies is a stable party system, which 
has not yet emerged in Ukraine. 
 
Early evidence suggests that the new electoral law may not do as much as hoped to 
encourage a more structured parliament. Formally, the new structure is much clearer: 
only five parties and blocs passed the 3% threshold in the March 2006 elections 
(Party of Regions, Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko, Our Ukraine, Socialists and 
Communists), there were only five factions in parliament and deputies were not 
allowed to switch membership. However, as the 1998 and especially 2002 elections 
demonstrated party list seats can be bought, this practice was reportedly even more 
widespread in 2006 across all parties. A secure place on a party list cost an estimated 
$2-8m (Paskhover, 2006: 32) and was easier to ‘buy’ than a constituency. So the 
change to party lists did not necessarily strengthen parties per se or reduce the number 
of ‘deputy-entrepreneurs’ seeking a deputy’s mandate to further their own business 
interests, who in turn would be susceptible to executive pressure on their businesses 
to vote ‘correctly’. Moreover, the imperative mandate included in the constitutional 
amendments is not likely to lead to more cohesive factions, just less disciplined ones 
when it comes to voting. Early indicators in the new parliament bear this out, as 
during key votes such as the first reading of the 2007 budget or the dismissal of 
Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko, despite a strict voting decisions neither Yulia 
Tymoshenko Bloc or Our Ukraine were able to hold the faction together. By 
December 2006, eight deputies had been expelled from their factions for breaking 
                                                
14 It is worth remembering that the changes were pushed by Kuchma primarily as a 
means of reducing the impact of a potential presidential victory for Yushchenko and 
retaining power for his allies in parliament, thus minimising the impact of the ‘orange 
revolution’.  
party discipline, but either sat as independents or joined the coalition as despite the 
constitutional change, there was no clear mechanism to remove their deputies’ 
mandates.   
 
In the first instance, the new constitutional arrangements did not clarify the division 
of powers or bring greater stability to Ukraine’s political system. Due to the 
fragmentation of political forces and uncertain rules of the game, it took over four 
months to form a coalition and a government. From August 2006 the ‘anti-crisis 
coalition’ of the Party of Regions, the Socialists and Communists supported a 
coalition government headed by Viktor Yanukovych. The new arrangement 
fundamentally altered the structure of principal-agent relations in the political system: 
as previously, the Prime Minister was subject to two principals – president and 
parliament – but after the constitutional reform, it was the parliament (or rather the 
coalition) that was decisive in the appointment and dismissal of both the government 
and individual ministers. This created powerful incentives for the government to work 
closely with the Rada15 and left the president isolated and struggling to assert his 
remaining prerogatives, including in the sphere of foreign policy (for example, see 
Zerkalo Nedeli, 23 September 2006). Nevertheless, the anti-crisis coalition was a 
rather heterogeneous body, and many bills were adopted by situational majorities 
where Our Ukraine or the Tymoshenko Bloc voted with part of the coalition. A case 
in point was the voting on seven bills required for WTO accession on November 2 
2006 (see roll-call votes on www.rada.gov.ua).  
 
At the same time, the gaps in the new rules rapidly engendered inter-branch conflict. 
Although such conflict has been a defining feature of Ukrainian politics, the new 
constitutional rules shifted the dimension from president-parliament to president-
government, with the latter backed by the coalition. As well as the aforementioned 
struggle over the prerogative to form foreign policy, the president and prime minister 
became embroiled in disagreements over the role of the prime minister’s counter 
signature on presidential decrees, over the discretion of the president in accepting no-
confidence votes in governors taken by oblast councils and over the right of the 
parliament to dismiss the foreign and defence ministers, who were appointed by the 
president. Attempts to adopt enabling legislation to clarify these issues, in particular a 
law on the Cabinet of Ministers, embodied this conflict with both president and 
government each initiating their own draft laws that attempted to frame the 
government’s operation to their own advantage. Consequently, the chances for this 
law to be enacted remained small, but during autumn 2006 the debate about 
‘completing’ the constitutional reform with either further changes to the constitution 
or by overturning the changes of 2004 gained momentum.16 This meant that 
uncertainty about Ukraine’s political system was likely to continue in the short to 
medium term.   
                                                
15 For example, this was immediately visible in plenary sessions, where the 
government lobbies in the Rada were well-staffed on a daily basis, which had often 
been far from the case in previous convocations (author’s observations, 2000, 2003, 
2006).  
16 During autumn 2006, the Ukrainian national television news and press were full of 
items concerning the need to either overturn or ‘improve’ the constitutional reforms. 
For example, see Den’, 3 November 2006 and Ukrains’ka Pravda, 3 November 2006 
and 8 November 2006.  
 
Yet Ukraine’s altered political landscape after the ‘orange revolution’ is a source of 
possible optimism. Lines of accountability should be enhanced under the new 
arrangement as it is clearer to the electorate who is responsible for policy decisions 
(i.e. the government and the parliamentary coalition). The new constitutional 
framework could in the longer term facilitate the realisation of Bagehot’s ‘efficient 
secret’ of a strongly linked parliament and government that engenders more effective 
and predictable law-making. Until then, the legislative process and the relatively low 
level of parliamentary institutionalisation present significant challenges for the 
implementation of the Action Plan and other legislation that will facilitate Ukraine’s 
greater integration with Europe. Overcoming them will require a commitment to 
clarify the responsibilities between executive organs and between the branches of 
power. At the same time, the EU can contribute to improving the quality of bills by 
providing increased technical support to the government and parliamentary 
committees on the preparation/harmonisation of legislation along the lines of that 
offered to EU candidate states (Ukrainian Monitor 2004). Plans to re-launch and 
substantially expand the activities of UEPLAC should be welcomed in this light. 
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